

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0291

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: DISCUSSION OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN NATO

REF: USNATO 5445

1. WE ARE ENCOURAGED BY BUSINESSLIKE TONE OF FIRST
SPC DISCUSSION OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN OCTOBER 3
SESSION AND SKILLFUL WAY IN WHICH USNATO STRUCTURED
THE DISCUSSION.

2. IN THE INTERESTS OF REACHING TIMELY DECISIONS WHICH
FIT INTO THE ALLIED NEGOTIATING SCHEDULE, WE CONSIDER
IT IMPORTANT TO MAKE THE DISCUSSION OF AIR MANPOWER
AT NATO AS MANAGEABLE AND FOCUSED AS POSSIBLE. IN
THIS SENSE, WE BELIEVE IT CORRECT THAT USNATO HAS
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SUPPORTED APPROACH OF KEEPING NATO TREATMENT OF THE

ISSUE OF NO-INCREASE OF AIR MANPOWER SEPARATE FROM THE QUESTION OF REDUCING AIR MANPOWER SO THAT IT CAN BE DECIDED ON ITS OWN AS A FIRST ITEM. ACCORDING TO OUR CALCULATIONS, THE ALLIES SHOULD BE IN A POSITION BY THE THIRD WEEK IN OCTOBER TO PUT FORWARD THE NO-INCREASE POINT. IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT THIS DEADLINE COULD BE MET IF THE NO-INCREASE SUBJECT WAS CONSIDERED AS PART OF A SINGLE OVERALL COMPLEX ON AIR MANPOWER AND THUS TIED TO AN ALLIED DECISION ON AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS, WHICH MAY BE LONG IN COMING.

3. CONCERNING THE SUBSTANCE OF THE NO-INCREASE ISSUE, WE FAVOR THE PROCEDURE PROPOSED BY USNATO IN PARA 6 OF REFTEL OF AMENDING CM(74) 30 REVISED TO COVER AIR MANPOWER. THIS ROUTE PROVIDES THE MOST SHARP AND DIRECT FOCUS ON THE QUESTION AT NATO AND THAT LEAST LIKELY TO BE DISTRACTED INTO GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS. IN THIS SAME SENSE, HOWEVER, RATHER THAN AMEND THE OPERATIVE TEXT OF SECTION III OF CM(74)30 AS HAS BEEN SUGGESTED, IT MIGHT BE BETTER TO ADD AN ADDITIONAL POINT TO THE EXISTING GUIDANCE TO THE EFFECT THAT QUOTE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS ARE AUTHORIZED TO SUGGEST TO THE EAST THAT AIR MANPOWER COULD BE BROUGHT INTO THE NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT UNDER THE SAME CONDITIONS EARLIER OFFERED. ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD REFRAIN FROM GOING INTO FURTHER DETAILS AT THIS TIME, TELLING EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES THAT QUESTIONS OF DETAIL WOULD BE DEALT WITH AT A LATER STAGE WHEN SPECIFICS OF ALL SUGGESTED COMMITMENTS WOULD BE DISCUSSED. UNQUOTE. MORE SPECIFIC FORMULATIONS, SUCH AS THAT PROPOSED BY USNATO, ARE LINKED WITH THE OUTCOME OF DISCUSSION OF AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS AND RESULTING CEILINGS AND COULD THEREFORE DELAY REACHING NATO AGREEMENT ON THIS POINT.

4. IN FURTHER DISCUSSING THIS TOPIC WITH ALLIES, US OFFICIALS MAY WISH TO DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

A. IT IS IN THE ALLIED INTEREST TO CLOSE THE DOOR AGAINST LARGE-SCALE CIRCUMVENTION BY THE EAST OF
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A LIMIT ON PACT GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE REDUCTION AREA WHICH WOULD RESULT FROM A PHASE I AGREEMENT. EASTERN CIRCUMVENTION COULD TAKE THE FORM OF INCREASING THE NUMBER OF NOMINAL AIR FORCE PERSONNEL IN THE AREA OF ORGANIZING THEM FOR GROUND COMBAT DUTY. THE PACT WILL HAVE A SIMILAR INTEREST VISA-A-VIS NATO.

B. THEORETICALLY, THIS POSSIBILITY COULD BE

HANDLED THROUGH A NON-CIRCUMVENTION COMMITMENT DESIGNED TO AVOID DIRECT OR INFERENTIAL LIMITS ON CHANGES IN THE SIZE OR ACTIVITIES OF AIR FORCES, PROVIDED THAT THOSE CHANGES WOULD NOT HAVE THE EFFECT OF CAUSING THE AIR FORCES TO PERFORM TRADITIONAL GROUND FORCE FUNCTIONS. A FORMULATION OF THIS TYPE WOULD MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF AN MBFR AGREEMENT LIMITED SOLELY TO GROUND FORCES. THIS APPROACH APPEARS TO REFLECT FRG THINKING ON THIS ISSUE HERETOFORE.

C. TO IMPLEMENT SUCH AN APPROACH, A NON-CIRCUMVENTION COMMITMENT MIGHT PROVIDE THAT PARTICIPANTS WOULD NOT TAKE ANY ACTION WHICH WOULD CIRCUMVENT THE PURPOSES AND PROVISIONS OF THE REDUCTION AGREEMENT, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE USE OF ANY OTHER MILITARY FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA TO PERFORM FUNCTIONS PERFORMED ON THE DATE OF THE REDUCTION AGREEMENT BY THEIR GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT THAT SUCH FUNCTIONS WERE ALREADY BEING PERFORMED ON SUCH DATE BY SUCH OTHER MILITARY FORCES.

D. BUT SUCH A FORMULATION WOULD NOT DEAL WITH THE EASTERN DEMAND THAT AIR FORCES BE INCLUDED IN REDUCTIONS, NOR FULFILL THE PURPOSE OF ASCERTAINING WHETHER THERE WERE ACCEPTABLE WAYS OF MEETING THIS DEMAND AT THE LOWEST COST TO THE ALLIES AND WITH MAXIMUM GAIN FOR THE ALLIED NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVE OF ELIMINATING PACT GROUND FORCES SUPERIORITY IN THE AREA.

E. THUSFAR IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS, EVERYTHING SAID ON AIR FORCES BY THE EAST INDICATES THAT THE
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EAST WILL NOT ACCEPT AN MBFR AGREEMENT WHICH DOES NOT PLACE SOME LIMIT ON AIR FORCE MANPOWER GOING BEYOND THE NARROWLY DEFINED LIMITATION LINKED TO GROUND COMBAT FUNCTIONS DESCRIBED ABOVE.

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FROM US REP MBFR

F. IF THIS IS THE CASE, THE QUESTION FOR DECISION
THEN BECOMES WHICH TYPE OF LIMITATION SHOULD BE ENVISAGED
FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF ALLIED INTERESTS.

G. THERE APPEAR TO BE TWO MAIN POSSIBILITIES: COVERAGE
UNDER A NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISION, OR INCLUSION OF AIR
MANPOWER UNDER A MODIFIED VERSION OF THE NO-INCREASE
COMMITMENT ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER THE ALLIES HAVE ALREADY
PROPOSED TO THE EAST.

5. SUGGESTING TO THE EAST THE POSSIBILITY OF LIMITING
INCREASES IN AIR FORCE MANPOWER THROUGH A NON-CIRCUMVENTION
CLAUSE COULD BE EASILY DONE AT THE PRESENT JUNCTURE OF
THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS BY SIMPLY TELLING THE EAST THAT
NON-CIRCUMVENTION COMMITMENTS IN CONNECTION WITH A PHASE
I AGREEMENT COULD BE DRAFTED TO PRECLUDE INCREASES IN AIR
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FORCE MANPOWER OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE REDUCTION
AREA. IN CONCLUDING AN ACTUAL AGREEMENT, BOTH SIDES
COULD MAKE STATEMENTS TO THIS EFFECT OR SOME REFERENCE TO
AIR FORCE MANPOWER COULD BE WRITTEN INTO THE ACTUAL TEXT OF
A NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISION.

6. COVERING AIR FORCE MANPOWER BY THE NON-CIRCUMVENTION APPROACH WOULD HAVE THE ADVANTAGE OF PERMITTING SOME DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY FOR BOTH SIDES. DEPENDING ON THE POLITICAL CLIMATE, INCREASES OF, SAY, UP TO 5 PERCENT IN AIR FORCE MANPOWER MIGHT BE TOLERATED WITHOUT SERIOUS COMPLAINT. BUT LARGER INCREASES WOULD PROBABLY BE REGARDED AS A SERIOUS INFRACTION BY BOTH SIDES AND CHALLENGED.

7. ON THE OTHER HAND, A NON-CIRCUMVENTION COMMITMENT AS APPLIED TO AIR FORCE MANPOWER HAS SEVERAL DISADVANTAGES:

A. IT IS IMPRECISE, LEADING TO LACK OF CLARITY ON BOTH SIDES, THUS CREATING THE POSSIBILITY OF FRICTION AND MISUNDERSTANDING.

B. IF AIR FORCE MANPOWER WERE LIMITED BY A NON-CIRCUMVENTION COMMITMENT IN CONNECT WITH A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT RATHER THAN BY INCLUSION IN AN EXPANDED VERSION OF THE ALLIED NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT, THEN THE ALLIES COULD BE FACED BY A SITUATION WHERE THEY HAVE FOR GOOD REASON LIMITED THE DURATION OF A NO-INCREASE LIMITATION ON GROUND FORCES, BUT WHERE THE LIMIT ON AIR FORCE MANPOWER WILL CONTINUE IN FORCE INDEFINITELY UNLESS A PHASE I AGREEMENT WERE TO BE NULLIFIED BY THE WITHDRAWAL OF ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER. TO GIVE THE EAST SUCH AN ENDURING HOLD ON NATO, AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT IS UNDESIRABLE.

C. MOVES TO INCLUDE A NON-CIRCUMVENTION COMMITMENT ON AIR FORCE MANPOWER EITHER IN THE TEXT OF A PHASE I AGREEMENT OR IN SEPARATE DECLARATIONS BY OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS COULD OPEN THE WAY FOR INTRODUCTION OF FURTHER SPECIFIED LIMITS ON OTHER FORCES OR ARMAMENTS. WE CANNOT KNOW NOW WHETHER THE EAST WOULD ACTUALLY PURSUE THIS COURSE, BUT THEIR DRAFT AGREEMENT
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EVIDENCES A HIGHLY RESTRICTIVE APPROACH.

D. MORE SPECIFICALLY, TO TRY TO SET AN UPPER LIMIT FOR AIR FORCE MANPOWER THROUGH USE OF A NON-CIRCUMVENTION CLAUSE POSES AN ADDITIONAL PROBLEM WITH REGARD TO NAVAL FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. BY EAST-WEST AGREEMENT, NAVAL FORCES IN THE AREA HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED FROM THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE KHLESTOV ONCE AGAIN REAFFIRMED THIS POINT IN THE INFORMAL SESSION IN VIENNA OF OCTOBER 1. HOWEVER, EVEN AN AGREED STATEMENT BY BOTH SIDES THAT THE PROHIBITION AGAINST CIRCUMVENTION OF THE AGREEMENT WAS

INTERPRETED TO MEAN THAT INCREASES IN AIR FORCE MANPOWER WOULD BE CONSIDERED CIRCUMVENTION OF THE AGREEMENT WOULD BY INFERENCE RAISE THE QUESTION AS TO WHETHER INCREASES OR REORGANIZATION IN OTHER ARMED FORCES MANPOWER IN THE AREA, I.E., THAT OF NAVAL FORCES IN THE AREA, WOULD ALSO BE CONSIDERED CIRCUMVENTION. THIS DIFFICULTY HAS ALREADY BEEN DEMONSTRATED IN THE FORMULATION IN PARA 4 (C) ABOVE.

HOWEVER, THIS PROBLEM DOES NOT ARISE WHEN A LIMIT ON AIR FORCE MANPOWER IS APPLIED THROUGH A NO-INCREASE PROVISION. BECAUSE THE COMMITMENT OF BOTH SIDES IS SPECIFIC, THE ONLY CIRCUMVENTION POSSIBLE WOULD BE AN INCREASE OF THAT MANPOWER WHICH HAD BEEN PLACED UNDER A CEILING.

E. IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR ALLIED NEGOTIATORS TO EXPLAIN TO THE EAST, WITHOUT ACTIVATING THE EASTERN CONCERNS THEY WERE SEEKING TO QUIET, WHY THE ALLIES WERE WILLING TO PUT GROUND FORCE MANPOWER UNDER A NO-INCREASE PROVISION BUT WERE UNWILLING TO DO SO FOR AIR FORCE MANPOWER AND WERE INSTEAD INSISTING THAT IT BE TREATED DIFFERENTLY UNDER-NON-CIRCUMVENTION.

F. BECAUSE INCLUSION OF A NON-CIRCUMVENTION COMMITMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF AN MBFR AGREEMENT IS LESS SPECIFIC, PROPOSING THIS AS A WAY OF MEETING EASTERN CONCERNS ON AIR MANPOWER WOULD PROVIDE A LESS EFFECTIVE WAY OF DEALING WITH THOSE CONCERNS AND A
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LESS ACCURATE TEST OF THE DEGREE OF EASTERN INTEREST IN REDUCING AIR MANPOWER. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES ARE LIKELY TO RESPOND THAT NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISIONS ARE A STANDARD PART OF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS AND THAT THE ALLIED SUGGESTION IS NOT RESPONSIVE TO THEIR CONCERNS.

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FROM US REP MBFR

8. WE DO NOT CONSIDER THAT, BY THE ACT OF AGREEING TO LIMIT AIR FORCE MANPOWER, THE ALLIES WOULD THEREBY MAKE REDUCTIONS OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER OR EQUIPMENT A LEGITIMATE OBJECT OF NEGOTIATION: AGREEING TO LIMIT SOMETHING, THAT IS TO LEAVE IT IN ITS PRESENT CONDITION, DOES NOT IMPLY WILLINGNESS TO REDUCE IT OR TO NEGOTIATE FURTHER ABOUT IT.

9. IF THE CURRENTLY PROPOSED NO INCREASE FOR GROUND FORCES PROVISION WERE EXPANDED TO COVER AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN CONNECTION WITH A PHASE I AGREEMENT, AND A PHASE II AGREEMENT WERE LATER NEGOTIATED, THEN THE PHASE II AGREEMENT COULD EITHER CONTINUE THE AIR MANPOWER NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT OR AIR MANPOWER COULD AT THAT POINT BE BROUGHT UNDER THE COMMON CEILING WITH OR WITHOUT PROVISION FOR AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS.

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10. AS REGARDS OTHER ASPECTS OF NATO CONSIDERATION OF AIR MANPOWER, WE HOPE THAT, FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF REACHING AN OUTCOME WHICH IS USEFUL FOR NEGOTIATING PURPOSES AND WHICH CONSERVES EFFORT IN THE CONSULTATION PROCESS, NATO DISCUSSION, WHILE EXAMINING ALL POSSIBILITIES, CAN FOCUS ON THE PROS AND CONS OF

OBLIGATORY REDUCTIONS. ASSUMING THAT EARLIER ALLIED STEPS HAVE NOT SUCCEEDED IN MEETING EASTERN CONCERNS ABOUT AIR MANPOWER, BUT TO THE CONTRARY HAVE DEVELOPED EVIDENCE OF STRONG EASTERN INTEREST IN AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS, ALLIED PROPOSALS SHORT OF OBLIGATORY REDUCTIONS MIGHT HAVE SOME LIMITED TACTICAL VALUE AS FURTHER TESTS OF THE INTENSITY OF EASTERN INTEREST IN AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS. BUT THEY WILL NEITHER MEET EASTERN CONCERNS NOR GENERATE NEGOTIATING LEVERAGE FOR THE ALLIES. FOR EXAMPLE, AN OFFER TO INCLUDE AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN THE NUMERICAL BASE FOR REDUCTIONS PLUS A REQUIREMENT THAT BOTH SIDES TAKE ALL REDUCTIONS IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IS UNLIKELY TO APPEAL TO THE EAST AFTER ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES HAVE TOLD THEM THAT AIR FORCE MANPOWER IS APPROXIMATELY EQUAL ON BOTH SIDES. SIMILARLY, SUGGESTING TO THE EAST THAT IT BE AGREED THAT MANPOWER REDUCTIONS COULD INCLUDE AIR FORCE MANPOWER ON A VOLUNTARY BASIS WILL NOT MEET EASTERN CONCERNS IF EAST HAS BEEN INSISTING ON REDUCTIONS IN AIR FORCE MANPOWER. RESOR

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